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Introduction
Decision making is such a fundamental part of human mental activity that a satisfac tory explanation of how people choose between various alternatives would seem to be a central problem for behavioral science. The literature in the area of individual decision making is commonly traced back at least as far as Bernoulli (1738) . He proposed a descriptive model of risky decision behavior based on the idea that people maximize expected utility in selecting among alternatives. The expected utility (EU) is given by :
n EU=Z A U(Xi) where P; is the probability of outcome i but U (X,) is the utility of outcome i which is some function (perhaps logarithmic) of the monetary value X1.
In the last 35 years or so, a number of variations on the basic EU or expectation type model have been proposed (Schoemaker, 1982; Payne, 1985) . For example, Edwards (1954) proposed a subjectively expected utility model where a subjective probability func tion S(Pi) is used along with a utility function to represent risky preferences. The usual assumption of subjective expected utility theory has been that decision makers act so as to maximize their subjective expected utilities.
This assumption has two major implica tions : (1) Decision makers will switch from a current action alternative to another action alternative when the subjective expected utility of the new alternative exceeds the subjec tive expected utility in continuing the current alternative.
(2) Decision makers will select the action alternative with the highest subjective expected utility. Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1957 discussed the psychological implications of individual decision making as prescribed by normative theories, such as EU or SEU theories, would exceed the information processing limits of the individual.
He proposed that people may use simpler decision strategies that reduce the processing load to within manageable limits. As an example, Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1957 considered "satisficing", a strategy where the individual chooses the first alternative that meets a minimum set of requirements on all attributes. Satisficing was assumed to involve less processing capacity because the number of alterna tives evaluated is likely to be less and the operations involved in evaluation are simpler. In the years that followed, a great number of decision strategies have been proposed, made into axioms and empirically supported (Beach and Mitchell, 1978: Bettman, 1979; Svenson, 1979; Takemura, 1985) . The research on decision making showed that people used a variety of decision strategies for making choices and the selection of these strategies were largely contingent on characteristics of the decision task, such as the numbers of alternatives and attributes (Payne, 1976; Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Bettman, 1979 , Svenson, 1979 Takemura, 1985) . Individual preferences of decision strategies do not necessarily match the actual characteristics of those strategies (Wright, 1975 ; Adelbratt and Montgomery, 1980; Takemura, in press ). People may under or overestimate the thinking costs and decision benefits associated with different decision strategies, thus influencing the selection of decision strategies. What little research there is in this area indeed suggests discrepancies between the actual and perceived characteristics of decision strategies (Abelson and Levi, 1985) . Wright (1975) studied subjects' preferences of four decision strategies in decision tasks with different numbers of alternatives. Adelbratt and Montgomery (1980) also investigat ed the preferences of six decision strategies. Abelson and Levi (1985) discussed that the Wright (1975) and Adelbratt and Montgomery (1980) studies lacked methods for verifying whether or not subjects executed the decision strategies exactly as the task instruction specified. As in the present study, using open-ended questionnaires and an interview method for the check, Takemura (in press) succeeded in examing the preferences of four decision strategies in the decision tasks with different numbers of alternatives and attrib utes. However, those studies did not examine the patterns of preference of the decision strategies.
The statistical method of research on the preference of decision strategies was analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA gives only an indication of how much the variance components contribute to decisional variation (Wright, 1985) . Wright (1985) pointed out that deeper theoretical questions about how situations and individuals interact to provide observed behavior were not answered by the statistics of ANOVA.
He recom mended the use of multivariate analysis techniques such as factor analysis in order to examine the variance of decision styles and decision situations. We examined the preference patterns of decision strategies in different situations and the related indexes of the decision making process, using the multivariate correlation analysis techniques such as factor analysis and canonical correlation analysis.
In sum, the purpose of present study was, first of all, to examine the preference patterns of different types of decision strategies in the decision tasks with the different numbers of alternatives and attributes, and secondly, to investigate the relationships of the preferences for decision strategies to the subjective inner states and time taken for decision (decision time) which were the indexes of decision making process.
2. The decision strategies Payne (1976) proposed that a decision strategy should specify two aspects of the process of choice : (1) There is the process by which an alternative is evaluated. This aspect of decision strategy can be viewed as taking information about alternatives as inputs and arriving at an attitude as an output. The two basic assumptions are compensa tory and non-compensatory information integration. Compensatory strategies imply that a decision maker will trade-off between a high value on one attribute of an alternative and a low value on another attribute. Non-compensatory strategies assume a decision maker combines information such that the presence (absence) of one attribute may not be able to compensate for the absence (presence) of others.
(2) There is the form of processing used in examing alternatives while making choice. Two basic processing forms are interdimen sional (alternative-wise) and intradimensional (attribute-wise) processing strategies. In the interdimensional strategies, each alternative is processed and evaluated as a whole, and then a choice is made on the basis of these overall evaluations using the choice criterion. The intradimensional strategies involve comparison of all alternatives on a single attribute, followed by comparisons on a second attribute, and so on.
In the present study, according to Payne's (1976) framework of taxonomy of decison strategies, the four strategies were selected : (1) Additive (ADD), (2) Additive-difference (ADD-DIF), (3) Conjunctive (CONJ), (4) Lexicographic (LEX) strategies.
Each strategy is frequently cited in the dicision making literature (Payne, 1976; Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Svenson, 1979; Montgomery, 1983; Takemura, 1985) . The ADD : ADD-DIF strat egies and CON J : LEX strategies are, respectively, compensatory and non compensatory strategies.
The ADD : CON J strategies and ADD-DIF : LEX strategies are, respectively, interdimensional and intradimensional strategies. Each strategy is as follows.
(1) Additive (ADD) strategy Additive model postulates that the evaluation E for and alternative is given directly by the strategy as :
where V, is an evaluation of the i th attribute and WZ is a weight associated with the i th attribute. This type of model contains subjectively expected utility (SEU) model (Edwards, 1954) and is very common in social psychological research, particularly as used in the multiple-attribute attitude model literature (e.g., Fishbein, 1967; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) .
(2) Additive difference (ADD-DIF) strategy Tversky (1969) proposed a decision heuristic called the additive difference strategy which also allows for intransitivity.
As formulated, the strategy considers binary choice, between two alternatives, say X and Y. The decision maker first considers differences between the subjective values for X and Y on each attribute. Let Uz (X =) and Ui ( Yi) be the subjective values (utilities) for X and Y on attribute i. Then quantities of the form U2 (X Z) Uz ( Y=) are considered, differences in the evaluations on attribute i. Each of these differences is then weighted by applying an increasing continuous differences function O= which specifies the contribution of the subjective differences for dimension i to the total relative evaluation of X and Y. Then X is preferred to or not different from Y if and
Although the strategy is formulated for binary choice, it may be extended to choice among more than two alternatives by sequentially comparing pairs of alternatives, retaining the winner each time for use in the next comparison (Payne, 1976) . (3) Conjunctive (CONJ) strategy The CONJ model implies that whether a multi-attribute alternative X = (Xi, X2, X,,) surpasses some stimulus or standard S = (S,, S2, .... S,i) will depend on X i being greater than Si for all i. In other words, an alternative must have a certain minimum value on all the relevant attributes in order to be chosen. Although the CON J rule may yield more than one acceptable alternative, a selected alternative is the first satisfactory one. An early example of this type of strategy was Simon's (1955 Simon's ( , 1957 principle of satisficing. The CON J strategy was axiomatize have been proposed and made an axiom by Coombs (1964) and Dawes (1964) .
(4) Lexicographic (LEX) strategy The lexicographic strategy assumes that attributes can be ordered in terms of impor tance. Alternatives are then first compared with respect to the most important attribute. If one alternative is preferred over all others for this attribute, that alternative is chosen, regardless of the values the alternatives have on the other attributes. If some set of alternatives are tied and preferred over all others on this first attribute, the second most important attribute is considered, and so on. The LEX strategy was made an axiom by Fishburn (1974) .
Method

Subjects
Sixty seven male and female Doshisha university undergraduates who enrolled in the introductory psychology course participated in the experiment. Three subjects were eliminated from the sample because those subjects could not explain the decision strategies exactly in the final check.
Stimuli
The stimuli were information matrices representing different radio-cassette players.
Radio-cassette players were chosen as the choice sets because most university students are involved and familiar with them (Kojima, Sugimoto and Nagano, 1985) . Each row of the matrix represented one attribute of radio-cassette players, and each column was labeled with a letter representing each radio-cassette player (e.g., Product A). Attributes were chosen on the basis of an exploratory study involving 137 undergraduates. The ten attributes most frequently listed as important in selecting a radio-cassette player were used in the present study. These were (1) design, (2) tone quality, (3) function of tape deck, (4) manufacturer, (5) ease of use, (6) weight, (7) durability, (8) colour, (9) size, (10) populality. In the 4 attributes condition, only the first 4 attributes were used. There were five levels of value on each attribute : greatly above average, above average, average, below average, greatly below average.
The value of each attribute for each unit was randomly selected from the five points that each attribute was permited to have. A decision task situation for a subject involved a number of alternatives, either 4 or 10, and a number of attributes available per alternative, either, 4 or 10. Each subject received the 16 possible combinations of the 4 types of decision strategies and the number of alternatives with the number of attribute per alternative. The order of presentation of the decision task situations and the order of the executions of decision strategies were counterbalanced among the subjects.
Procedure
All experimental sessions took place in groups of about five persons and took about one and a half hours.
In the standard introduction, the experimenter told subjects their tasks were try to apply the decision strategies assigned them as accurately as possible in making choices among sets of radio-cassette players. Subjects were instructed not to deviate in any way from their prescribed strategies. They were forewarned that they would be questioned on how they executed the decision startegies afterward. The subjects were then given a leaflet in which each decision strategy was described in general terms.
The descriptions of the decision strategies are given below.
(1) ADD strategy You try to get a general impression of the alternatives one at a time. Positive and negative characteristics of an alternative are compared with each other and summed up in a final impression. You look at the attributes of one alternative until all its attributes are examined which might contribute significantly to the overall value of that alternative.
When this is done, you begin examination of a new alternative. You continue until all alternatives are examined.
The alternative that turns out to be most attractive after such a general test is chosen.
(2) ADD-DIF strategy You examine and compare two alternatives on one attribute. Then you consider the same pair on another attribute. You continue untill all attributes have been examined which might contribute significantly to the overall difference in value between a pair of alternatives.
The alternative where the sum of positive differences is greater than the negative will go further to a comparison with the alternative chosen from some other examined pair. You continue until all alternatives are examined.
The procedure will be repeated until one alternative remains.
(3) CON J strategy You search one alternative, across attributes, as long as it rates above the your internal pass/fail criterion for each attribute.
You stop at the first observation of a `fail' value, and begin looking at a new alternative.
If an alternative has been searched on all attributes for which a criterion of minimum acceptability exits, and no `fail' values are obtained, You chose that alternative, and do not search other alternatives.
(4) LEX strategy You rank-order the attributes according to their significance and start comparing the alternatives on the first and thereby most important aspect. If you can find a superior alternative, this will be chosen at once. If no alternative is markedly better, you must go on to the next aspect in your rank-order and try again.
When the subjects had studied the material, they were instructed, on the blackboard, about the meaning of the strategies and the important differences between them. They were instructed to read the strategy descriptions and to ask the experimenter about them until they understood them clearly since they could not refer back to them after they began the decision tasks.
At each task, subjects were asked to measure decision time (in seconds) by a digital stop-watch with stimulus display timing." After each decison task, subjects were asked to rate the preference of each decision strategy with regard to the choice situation that had been presented to them. Subjects were asked "On an everyday basis, how often do you seem to use this same type of strategy incomparable situations?". The ratings were made on a seven-point scale from 1(=very rarely) to 7(=very frequently). Subjects were further told that two or more strategies could get the same rating if they were equally adequate or inadequate for solving the decision problem.
This rated frequency was the primary measure of the preferences of our decision strategies.
Next, for each task, they were asked to rate the following items designed to assess the several subjective inner states on seven-point soales. These items were very similar to the items in previous decision research (Jacoby, et al., 1974a, b ; Wright, 1975; Sugimoto, 1983; Takemura and Takagi, 1987a, b ; Takemura, in press ).
(1) Task difficulty : How difficult was it to make a decision? (1=very easy ; 7= very difficult) (2) Confusion : How confused did you feel while performing this task ? (1=not confused at all ; 7=very confused) (3) Confidence : How confident are you that you made the best decision?
(1=not confident at all ; 7 =very confident) (4) Perceived quantity of information : How did you feel about the quantity of presented information for each of the various brands?
(1=too little; 7=too much) (5) Load on memory : How did you fell the quantity of information which was needed for memorizing in making decision?
(1=too little; 7 = too much) (6) Regret : How much regret do you feel about your choice ? (I =no regret at all ; 7=very much regret) (7) Hesitation : How hesitant did you feel while performing this task?
(1=not hesitant at all ; 7=very hesitant) (8) Risk : How much risk or uncertainty did you feel while performing this task ? (1= none at all ; 7 = very much) Finally, after subjects finished 16 decision tasks, they responded to open-ended ques tions which were given to check the understanding of the prescribed decision strategies. Then, the experimenter interviewed the subjects in order to check the understanding and execution of the decision strategies in detail.
1) This use of subject's self reports of starting and finishing times could potentially be subject to biases. However, in the pilot study which used eight subjects, there was no significant difference between time reported by the subjects and time measured by the experimenter.
Results and discussion
Preference patterns of decision strategies
A correlation matrix for the preferences of decision strategies in 16 (4 x 2 x 2) condi tions was computed and factor analyzed by the principal component method. Several criteria were employed in determining the number of factors to be extracted : the scree test, the percent of variance accounted for (Cattell, 1966) , the Guttman criterion of eigenvalues greater than one (Guttman, 1954) , and the interpretability of rotated factor solutions (Hakstian and Muller, 1973) . Four factor were extracted, and accounted for 72.5 percent of the total variance. These factors were rotated to the promax criterion of oblique simple structure (Hendrickson and White, 1964) . Table  1 Promax rotated factor matrix for preferences of decision strategies
The reference structure and interfactor correlations are presented in Table 1 . The reference structure is the matrix of semipartial correlations (Kerlinger and Pedhazer, 1973) between variables and factors, removing from each factor the effects of other factors. The variables with salient semipartial correlations on the first factor were the LEX strategies in all decision task situations. The.salient variables on the second, the third, and the fourth factors were, respectively, the CONJ, ADD-DIF, and ADD strategies in all decision task situations.
The results indicated that subjects who obtain high scores on each factor tended to use each decision strategy frequently in different decision situations. The ADD factor had a moderately positive correlation with the ADD-DIF factor (r = .310). This positive correlation suggested that the preference of ADD strategy and the preference of ADD-DIF were based upon common psychological implications. The com mon psychological implications in the two strategies might be the features of compensatory processings which produce greater perceived information load and less perceived uncer tainty (Takemura, in press ). The LEX factor had a moderately negative correlation with the ADD factor (r::--.327), and a slightly negative correlation with the ADD-DIF factor (r=.217).
Lastly, the CONJ factor was virtually not correlated to the other three factors. This suggested that the preference of CONJ strategy was independent of the preferences for the other strategies.
There was a very high degree of similarity between these interfactor correlations, which are shown in Table 1 , and the directly computed correla tions among the four decision strategies, which are shown in Table 2 . Although there were these moderate correlations among the preferences of the four decision strategies, the results indicated that the subject's preference pattern of each decision strategy was consistent among the different task situations.
This result suggest ed that there were certain types of decisional styles in the individuals.
This may seem contradictory to the findings of decision research that decision strategies were largely contingent on characteristics of the decision task (cf. Payne, 1976 Payne, , 1982 Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Bettman, 1979; Svenson, 1979; Takemura, 1985) . However, the results did not contradict the findings of the previous decision research.
It follows that our findings provide another aspect of the contingent decision behavior.
As Wright (1985) discussed, ANOVA, which has been mainly used data analysis technique on the contingent decision behavior, gives only an indication of how much the variance components contrib ute to decisional variation. On the other hand, factor analysis used in the present study can present the pattern of decisional variation. These two statistical methodologies examine different aspects of decision behavior. On reflection, the results of factor analysis suggested that we can classify the individ uals into subgroups, in terms of the preferences of decision strategies. If this is correct, it is expected to be useful in predicting the decision behaviors and subsequent behaviors.
This possibility might have practical implications especially for advertising, marketing (cf. Bettman, 1979) , and decision support systems (cf. Huber, 1983 ; Wright, 1985) .
Preferences of decision strategies and indexes of decision making process
Subjective inner states and decision time for the decision strategies
A correlation matrix of the items for the subjective inner states in decision making process was computed and was factor analyzed by the principal component method. Two factors were extracted by the several criteria discussed above, and accounted for 73.0 percent of the total variance.
Varimax solutions were retained ; oblique rotations did not provide greater interpretability of better approximation to simple structure. The factor matrix is presented in Table 3 . The variables with salient loadings on the first factor were task difficulty, confusion, perceived quantity of information, load on memory, and hesita tion. On the other hand, the salient variables on the second factor were confidence, regret, and risk. The second factor is a contrast of regret and risk at the positive end, against confidence at the negative end. These patterns of subjective inner states were very similar to the results of previous decision research (Takemura, in press ; Takemura and Takagi, 1987a) . The two factors were interpreted as "perceived information load" and "perceived uncertainty", respectively, in accordance with the salient variables loading on them. Table 4 Correlations among perceived information load for decision strategies These two factors of subjective inner states correspond to two psychological functions suggested by Wright (1975) and Beach and Mitchell (1978) . They proposed that decision makers are continually trading off optimality and simplicity in deciding how to process information.
The simplicity and optimality functions are related to perceived information load and perceived uncertainty respectively.
On each factor of subjective inner states, correlations among the factor scores for the four decision strategies were computed and are shown in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. Then, correlations among decision time of the four decision strategies were calculated and presented in Table 6 . There was a high degree of similality between the patterns of correlations for the perceived information load and the decision time. The correlations for both the indexes of the decision making process are generally moderately positive.
These patterns indicated that subjects who tended to require greater decision time and experienced greater information load in implementing certain strategy had the same tendencies in implementing other strategies. On the other hand, correlations for the perceived uncertainty are comparatively low, except for moderately positive correlations between the ADD and ADD-DIF strategies (r =.405) and between the CONJ and LEX strategies (r =.255). The ADD and ADD-DIF strategies are compensatory processing, and the CONJ and LEX strategies are non-compensatory processing.
The results suggested that there were two groups of decision makers. One group tends to be very sensitive to uncertainty in implementing the compensatory types of strategies, and the other group was sensitive in implementing the non-compensatory types of strategies. Table  6 Correlations among decision time for decision strategies 4.2.2 Relationships of the preferences for decision strategies to the subjective inner states and decision times Correlations of the preference of each decision strategy with decision time, perceived information load, and perceived uncertainty were computed, and multiple regression analysis, with the preference of decision strategy as the criterion variable, was performed for each decision strategy.
The results are shown in Table 7 . The variances accounted for by these variables are comparatively high, especially for the CONJ and LEX strategies. For the non-compensatory strategies, the preferences had slightly positive correlations with the perceived information load and comparatively high negative correlations with perceived uncertainty. On the other hand, for the compensatory strategies, the prefer ences had only moderately negative correlations with perceived uncertainty.
Although there were some different patterns between compensatory and non-compensatory types strategies in terms of information load, the preference of each strategy was negatively correlated with perceived uncertainty. This suggested that the preferences of decision strategies were mainly determined by the reduction of uncertainty in the decision making process. Beach and Mitchell (1978) proposed a model of decision strategy selection which is applicable in both well and ill-defined situations. This model assumes that the strategy selection is contingent on a cost/benefit comprise between the desire to make an optimal decision and the perceived costs of investing time and effort in the decision making process. As Beach and Mitchell (1978) pointed out, decision makers may comprise between the optimality and simplicity in the decision making process. If this is true, the preference of decision strategy is hypothetized to be determined by the optimizing and simplifying potentials of each decision strategy. The result of this study suggested that decision maker's preferences were more determined by perceived optimizing potential than per ceived simplifying potential.
In order to simplify the total correlations between the preferences for decision strat egies and the indexes of the decision making process, canonical correlation analysis was performed.
The total set of 16 variables was intercorrelated and the resulting correlation coefficients were used in the analysis.
The preferences for the four decision strategies formed one domain of variables, while the perceived information load, perceived uncer tainty, and decision time for the four decision strategies respectively comprised the second domain of variables.
The squared canonical correlations at the four dimensions were computed and are shown in Table 8 . Although the squared canonical correlations reflect the general overlap between the two domains, they provide no information about the relative explanatory power of the two domains (cf. Gleason, 1976) . Therefore, the multivariate redundancy indexes (Stewart and Love, 1968) were calculated and are also presented in Table 8 . The redundancy is a index which examines how well the original variables can be predicted from the canonical variates. Table 9 Canonical structure between preferences of decision strategies and indexes of the decision making process As criteria for the number of canonical variates to retain we have used : an inspection of the eigenvalue for a "break" (cf. Cattell, 1966 , for a discussion of this rationale for factor analysis), the magnitude of the squared canonical correlation, an inspection of the redun dancy index for a "break", and the magnitude of redundancy index. The two canonical variates were extracted, the canonical structure for the first two variates are presented in Table 9 . For the preference domain, we found the salient loadings on the first variate for the LEX (.892) and the ADD-DIF strategies (-.418) .
In the domain of indexes of decision making process, the perceived uncertainty for the LEX (-.857) and ADD-DIF strategies (.382) are major loadings.
According to Payne's (1976) framework, the LEX and ADD-DIF strategies are intradimensional strategies. The first variates reflected the relationship between the preferences for intradimensional strategies and perceived uncertainty in the decision making process.
The first variates were the contrasts of the LEX strategy against the ADD-DIF strategy. The relationship suggested that subjects who prefered the LEX strategy felt less uncertainty in implementing the LEX strategy and greater uncer tainty in implementing the ADD-DIF strategy.
On the contrary, subjects who prefered the ADD-DIF strategy tended to feel less uncertainty in implementing the ADD-DIF strategy and greater uncertainty in implementing the LEX strategy.
For the preference domain, we found salient loadings on the second variate for the CONJ (.862) and the ADD (-.497) strategies. In the domain of indexes for the decision making process, we found the salient loadings for perceived information load for the CONJ strategy (.354), and perceived uncertainty for the ADD (.357) and CONJ strategies (-.805). The ADD and the CON J strategies are interdimensional strategies.
The second variates reflected the relationship of preferences of interdimensional strategies to the perceived information load and perceived uncertainty in decision making.
Like the first variates, the second variates were the contrasts of the CONJ strategy, which was non-compensatory against the ADD strategy, which was compensatory. This relationship suggested that subjects who prefered the ADD strategy felt less information load and greater uncertainty in implementing the CONJ strategy and felt less uncertainty for the ADD strategy. On the other hand, subjects who prefered the CON J strategy had the reverse tendencies. These results of canonical correlation analysis indicated that patterns of relationships between the preferences and indexes of decision making process were interrelated among the decision strategies in a systematical manner. We found that the relationships of interdimensional types of strategies were virtually independent from those of intradimen sional types of strategies, and that there were contrasts between compensatory type strategies and non-compensatory type strategies in both the inter and intradimensional strategies. In relation to this, Takemura (1985) suggested that the preferences of decision strategies reflected the knowledge structure of decision strategies and the influences of implementing the strategies on subjective inner states.
The results suggested that the knowledge structure about decision strategies was organized systematically in accordance with the Payne's (1976) taxonomy of decision strategies.
Conclusions
We examined first, the pereference patterns of different types of decision strategies in the decision task with different numbers of alternatives and attributes . In relation to the preferences, the ADD and ADD-DIF strategies, which were compensatory processes, were positively correlated to each other and had a negative correlation to the LEX strategy. The preference of CONJ strategy was independent of the preferences of the other strat egies. Although we found these interrelationships among the preferences of decision strategies, the results of factor analysis suggested that decision makers had particular preference patterns of decision strategies among the different decision task situations. The findings obtained here have some especially practical implications (cf. Bettman, 1979; Huber, 1983; Wright, 1985) . We examined secondly the relationships of the preferences of decision strategies to subjective inner states and decision time. Although there were some different relationship patterns between compensatory and non-compensatory types of strategies, the results suggested that the preference of each strategy was mainly determined by how much perceived uncertainty cound be reduced.
This findings were discussed in connection to the models for the selection of decision strategies (cf. Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Takemura, 1985) .
In the present study, the subjects were assigned only four decision strategies which they used instead of using a strategy naturally.
Other studies that investigate the prefer ence patterns of more decision strategies are needed. Some of these will require a liberation from laboratory conditions in which a relatively limited set of "simulated" decision problems have been used. Despite these limitations, our study provide data that point to the importance of the prefrence patterns of decision strategies in providing a more complete account of individual decision making process.
